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After Structural Adjustment (1986–1994), Tanzania moved from an era of 
heavy state involvement in agriculture to full liberalization, when all direct and 
indirect subsidies were removed (Isinika, 2003; Rune, 2005). There are others 
who argue that economic liberalization in Tanzania, as is the case in some 
other African countries, was never complete, being partial due to emphasis on 
price liberalization, uncoordinated timing and sequencing, lack of local commit-
ment and ownership, and weak institutional capacity (Kherallah et al., 2000; 
Cooksey, 2003). Pressure for economic liberalization came from bilateral and 
multilateral donors, led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, who used different techniques, including withdrawal of donor funds, 
which lead to a significant decline in foreign aid (Havnevik et al., 1988). 
Economic reforms were considered necessary to liberate the private sector and 
to get prices right so that they would reflect relative scarcities of resources for 
more effective allocation to achieve static efficiency. Many African countries 
were forced to agree with SAP prescriptions because they were desperately in 
need of foreign exchange to service outstanding debts. It was assumed that 
government withdrawal from market operations would enable farmers to 
respond to factor and product price signals, leading to innovation, specialization 
and accumulation (Rune, 2005).
The reform process continued during the 1990s, when Tanzania, like 
many other African countries, undertook more extensive reforms designed to 
turn around declining growth rates and reverse balance of payment deficits. 
In agriculture the reforms aimed to eliminate bias against the sector by remov-
ing price controls, deregulation of agricultural markets (which had been 
achieved by 1990) and closure of state-owned monopolies, which was com-
pleted in 2007 (Isinika, 2009). In 2001, Tanzania developed an Agricultural 
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Sector Development Strategy (ASDS), which defined the role of the state to 
be policy making, regulation and provision of public goods. The use of subsi-
dies as policy instruments was ruled out (Rune, 2005), only to be reversed a 
few years later.
While some initially hailed withdrawal of the state from market operations as 
a move in the right direction and that economic transformation was on course 
(IMF, 1986, 1995; World Bank, 1992), there are many other studies, however, 
which portray a different picture. A simulation analysis based on poverty reduction 
rates for the period 1992–2002 shows that growth rates attained until then were 
not enough to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Demombynes 
and Hoogeveen, 2004). Analysis of the post-Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAP) period up to 2000 shows that the outcome of the reforms fell short of 
expectations for agriculture in general but especially in relation to food production, 
forcing some countries, including Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania, to undergo 
policy reversal on fertilizer subsidies. Several countries also restored other forms of 
government intervention in the input sector (Kherallah et al., 2000).
Thus the policy and institutional environment of the new millennium (post 
2000) represents a relatively liberalized agricultural sector with some level of 
government intervention. Despite a strong push from international finance insti-
tutions, urging many African governments to pursue a hands-off policy in mar-
kets, it is common knowledge that many governments intervene in their food 
and agriculture sectors in a variety of ways, using subsidies, taxes, credit, price 
stabilization programmes and expenditure programmes to provide  incentives or 
to achieve income transfer for equity or to stimulate economic development 
(Stiglitz, 1987; Giovanni and McCalla, 1995). It is none the less correctly argued 
that such interventions should be carefully managed to minimize efficiency loss.
This calls for a careful balancing act so that, in addition to promoting poli-
cies that optimize static efficiency in resource allocation, the policies also 
enhance dynamic efficiency, such that technical progress and growth of land 
and labour productivity moves on a path of dynamic efficiency in the long term 
(Uma Lele, 1989; Rune, 2005). On this basis, careful phasing of subsidies over 
time has been recommended for India and Pakistan, in order to discourage 
inefficient use of fertilizer, water and electricity, and reverse escalating govern-
ment spending (Vaidyanathan, 2000). In addition, the literature suggests that 
the marginal opportunity cost of spending on subsidy or government transfer 
programmes is more likely greater than unity, to the tune of up to 50% higher 
(Alson and Hurd, 1990).
For poor countries such as Tanzania, the option to restore subsidies is a tough 
one, considering that there are many competing ends to use the same scarce 
resources (health, education, roads, etc.). Economic liberalization policies 
should therefore aim at achieving efficiency by maximizing returns, equity for 
distribution of income and food security. Realizing these policy objectives may 
be limited by supply constraints (resources, technology, relative prices and 
management), demand constraints (population, income, taste and relative 
prices) and world prices constraints through export and import (Monke and 
Pearson, 1989). Hence, governments may from time to time be required to 
make trade-offs between efficiency, income distribution and food security using 
different policy instruments.
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This paper examines the performance of food production and productivity 
in Tanzania since 2000, in relation to post-SAP policies. This discussion 
assumes that individual households in Tanzania strive to achieve food security 
through own production as well as purchases from the market. Meanwhile, the 
government strives to meet national food self-sufficiency of main staples (maize, 
rice and cassava) from local production, implying that individual farmers must 
produce a surplus, which is then marketed efficiently so that everybody can 
access sufficient and good-quality food at all times at affordable prices. Any 
change in the policy environment changes the opportunity set and hence the 
choices individuals make, which in turn shapes the aggregate performance of 
economies over time (North, 1993). It is in this context that the analysis in this 
paper looks at the performance of food production and marketing, at the 
micro and macro levels, during the post-SAP period in Tanzania, as influenced 
by preceding and prevailing policies and institutions, in particular focusing on 
the magnitude and direction of change. The discussion is guided by several 
questions: is there any change happening in food production? What is driving 
that change? Can the change be sustained? What is the role of supporting 
institutions, markets and governance in directing this change?
Reinforcing the Market Reforms
The timeline in Tanzania shows that while the thrust of the economic reforms 
during the 1980s was on markets – to get the prices right – the focus during the 
1990s shifted to institutions. Tanzania, like many other African countries, fol-
lowed the bandwagon of institutional reforms to consolidate market reforms 
that began in 1986. Specific for agriculture, there was a land policy in 1995 
(Shauri, 1995; Kaduma, 2005), followed by the land laws of 1991, which 
became operational in 2001, with amendments in 2003. Although the presi-
dent still holds all land in trust on behalf of the people of Tanzania, the new 
policy recognizes that land has intrinsic value, and hence can be marketed (URT, 
1994; Shauri, 1995; Kaduma, 2005), which represents a major departure from 
the socialist past. In 1997, the agricultural policy was approved, recognizing the 
private sector as a key player for agricultural transformation, especially in rela-
tion to input supply, value addition and service delivery (Yoshida, 2005).
Considering the need for a sector-wide approach, Tanzania undertook 
 further analysis of agriculture to determine how to foster accelerated sector 
transformation for wealth creation and poverty reduction. This was preceded 
by macro-level poverty reduction strategies, and followed by the ASDS, com-
pleted in 2001. The ASDS was designed to conform and contribute to the 
National Strategy of Growth and Poverty Reduction – more commonly 
known as MKUKUTA,1 which has set targets in three clusters for: (i) achiev-
ing growth and poverty reduction; (ii) improving the quality of life and social 
wellbeing; and (iii) good governance. The ASDS is operationalized through 
1
 MKUKUTA is the Kiswahili acronym of Mpango wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umaskini, 
which is equivalent to National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (NSGPR).
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the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP), which requires 
coordination between five agricultural sector lead ministries2 as well as Local 
Government Authorities (LGAs). These are responsible for coordinating 
 programme implementation at the local level.
In relation to food security, the ASDS aims to support regions and LGAs 
(districts, wards and villages) to plan and implement effective District Agricultural 
Development Programmes, such that they meet food security needs of vulner-
able groups through assured input provision, training for skills upgrading, regu-
lar monitoring and strengthening the capacity of smallholder farmers and 
service providers to organize and have a strong voice in markets as well as 
other local institutions that affect their livelihoods (URT, 2001, 2005). These 
institutional reforms were expected to change the incentive structure in accord-
ance with North (1993), which would in turn induce a change in choices available 
to actors in agriculture, hence translating into different technical measures and 
changes in farm practice, and hence improvement in farm productivity and 
production (Gibson and Knoontz, 1998).
However, as institutional reforms proceeded, the experience of many 
African countries on food production and productivity during the post-SAP 
period did not live up to such expectations. In Tanzania, analysis of data for the 
period 1986–2000 shows that while total output of main staples may have 
been increasing, productivity, however, was declining, especially for maize and 
rice (Kherallah et al., 2000; Isinika et al., 2005). Rice was hailed by the World 
Bank as the fastest-growing crop during the 1990s (World Bank, 1994), but 
2
 The five agricultural sector lead ministries are: Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and 
Ccooperatives (MAFSCO), Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries (MLF), Ministry of 
Water and Irrigation (MWI), Prime Minister’s Office – Ministry of Regional Administration Local 
Government (PO-MRALG). The exact name of the ministry may change from time to time but 
basic functions generally remain the same.
ASDS purpose: to stimulate and facilitate agricultural sector growth and reduce rural poverty.
ASDS strategic objectives:
(i) Create enabling and favourable environment to improve agricultural productivity and
profitability; and
(ii) Increase farm income to reduce rural poverty and ensure household food security.
ASDS is in line with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) and
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
ASDP Phase one: 5 years (2005–2010)
ASDP Phase two: being developed (2011–2014)
Seventy-five per cent of funding goes to local component for LGA to finance District Agricultural
Development Programmes (DADPs). 
Twenty-five per cent of funding for national component (Ministries).
Uses basket funding from government (75.6%), donors (21.7%) and farmers (2.6%).
Coordination and funding of research and extension services designed to improve and involve
more stakeholder participation in co-funding and decision making.
Fig. 12.1. Salient features of the ASDS and ASDP.
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such production growth came from area expansion (Isinika et al., 2003; Rune, 
2005). Productivity declined for both land and labour, and for all major food 
staples. Rune (2005) noted that per capita maize productivity (land and labour), 
and even agricultural gross domestic product (GDP), actually fell by 2.5% in the 
interval 1986–1998, while the trend growth rate of maize production declined 
by 1.1%. The analysis by Rune shows further that maize productivity perform-
ance post-SAP was worse than before structural adjustment was introduced 
(Table 12.1), contrary to earlier positive prognosis (Delgado et al., 1999).
A Declining Trend
Following the commencement of SAP policies in 1986, fertilizer use fell steeply 
after the removal of fertilizer subsidy, reaching only 63,000 tonnes in 1998/99, 
from a peak of over 100,000 in 1990 (World Bank, 2000; Isinika et al., 
2003). The proportion of farmers who used fertilizer fell from 27% in 1990/91 
to only 10.5% in 1997/98. Maize farmers used rates below recommended 
levels (Hawasi et al., 1999; Isinika and Mdoe, 2001) because of high prices 
and fertilizer not being available as reported by 47% and 27%, respectively, of 
the farm holding according to the Expanded Agricultural Survey (URT, 1998). 
Fertilizer prices increased up to the point where, in some parts of the country, 
correlation between the price of maize and fertilizer became negative (Bilame, 
1996). In remote regions such as Ruvuma and Rukwa, use of inorganic 
fertilizer on maize became unprofitable, changing the spatial distribution of 
maize-producing areas in the country as regions in the central part of Tanzania 
(e.g. Dodoma) gained prominence due to their competitive advantage in 
 marketing, being close to main consuming areas (Kherallah et al., 2000; Isinika 
et al., 2005). Similarly, regions in the north (such as Manyara and Arusha) 
resumed prominence in maize production due to their comparative advantage 
of natural fertility, such that maize can be produced using less fertilizer (Rune, 
2005). Declining fertilizer use was reinforced further by soil fertility decline due 
to soil mining. Farmers responded by rolling back to subsistence production 
and diversification out of agriculture – that did not amount to specialization. 
While fertilizer use is the most documented input, the use of other inputs 
(improved seed and agro-chemicals) also fell. The persistent use of the hand 
Table 12.1. Labour productivity in major food grains. (Adapted from: Rune, 2005.)
Period
Maize
Five major food cropsa
Labour 
productivity
Kg/capita of 
total population
1976–1986 −0.66 +0.25 +1.08 +0.66
1985–1998 −1.99 −2.35 +1.35 −1.80
aFive major food crops include; maize, rice, wheat, sorghum and millet. They accounted for 
59.7% of food tonnage (1995/96–1997/98).
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hoe by more than 60% of farming households also continued to be a limiting 
factor (URT, 2006)
The rate of innovation uptake is a function of several factors, including 
availability of technologies and the means by which farmers can access and use 
those technologies. Lack of credit has also been mentioned as a serious bot-
tleneck to technology uptake among smallholder farmers. The weak link 
between farmers, extension services and research has also been blamed for low 
uptake of many agricultural innovations, especially in Africa, where both exten-
sions and research services are very weak. In 1997 extension services in 
Tanzania were decentralized, relegating powers for planning and delivery of 
these services to LGAs, which fall under the Prime Minister’s Office – Regional 
Administration and Local Government. The ministries responsible for agriculture 
and livestock development retained the mandate for policy making, advisory and 
technical backstopping when called upon to do so (Isinika, 2000, 2003). Within 
most LGAs, extension services were relegated to the back seat, receiving low 
priority on resource allocation and in technical upgrading of staff through train-
ing, which was compounded by staff attrition, the outcome of a freeze on staff 
recruitment since the early 1990s (Isinika, 2002) and decimation from HIV and 
AIDS (Arndt and Wobst, 2002). Thus agricultural extension and research 
increasingly comprised an ageing personnel, who had very low motivation due 
to a multitude of factors. All these changes, plus other institutional constraints, 
culminated in declining productivity of the main staple crops. Something had 
to be done to reverse the situation.
How did food markets behave? The immediate effect of economic liberali-
zation was to increase the number of private traders, especially in the product 
market. According to Kherallah et al. (2000) the impacts of market reforms in 
several African countries such as Tanzania have included expansion of private 
traders, even where parastatal organizations are still active. However, further 
expansion is constrained by lack of credit and uncertainty about government 
commitment to the reform (Cooksey, 2003). Bigsten and Danielsson (1999) 
attribute such resistance to Nyerere,3 who they argue never fully supported the 
reforms, and he continued to have influence even after his retirement in 1985. 
It is consequently argued that the reforms were partial, emphasizing price 
 liberalization. Timing and sequencing was not well coordinated; commitment 
and ownership was low and institutional capacity was weak. Cooksey (2003) 
none the less admits that maize market liberalization has been successful, and 
the availability of maize has kept pace with demand.
In general, the market impacts of the policy reforms have improved market 
integration as vertical linkages with traders and exporting firms have facilitated 
financing of crop purchased, especially for rice. None the less, the level of their 
investment in food markets has been low, with little evidence of specialization 
in service delivery (such as storage) to facilitate marketing. Transport is often 
a bargained-on-the-spot market. The analysis by Kherallah et al. (2000) for the 
3
 Julius Nyerere is the first president of Tanganyika, which gained independence in 1961. In 
1964 Tanganyika formed a union government with Zanzibar to form Tanzania. Nyerere retired 
as president of Tanzania in 1985.
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post-SAP period showed that markets, not only in Tanzania but in many African 
countries as well, remained risky, personalized and cash based. There were 
numerous traders but many of them lacked experience, and oversupply forced 
many of them to exit from distribution.
On a positive note, the reforms reduced inflation from over 30% during 
the early 1990s to single digit by 1999 (7.9%), declining further to 4.6% in 
2001 (Ratasitara, 2004). But inflation has since crept back to double digit, 
being 12.2% in December 2009. Other positive impacts are: reduced fiscal 
burden, improved timing and delivery of inputs, and facilitated regional trade in 
food crops. There has also been some increase in farm prices but with reduced 
marketing margins, especially for food crops (Kherallah et al., 2000). Isinika 
et al. (2005:210)4 also reported that 54% of the respondents considered maize 
prices to have improved since their households were formed, but the study 
found little evidence of market integration happening for food crops in general, 
except in well-connected areas. In the case of rice, however, the majority (58%) 
of respondents from the same study reported improved prices and market 
integration following upgrading of transport infrastructure, but profitability had 
decreased as input prices had gone up.
Policy Reversal
By the end of the last millennium (1990s), food production, especially on a per 
capita basis, was stagnant or declining. The market reforms did not induce 
smallholder farmers to specialize or to use improved technologies as envisaged. 
Nor did the reforms solve the underlying problems of credit availability and 
poor infrastructure for transportation, communication and irrigation, confirm-
ing the post-Washington Consensus that macroeconomic stability, trade liber-
alization and getting the price right is not enough (Stigltz, 1998a,b). During the 
budget of 2003/04, the government announced the intention to restore subsi-
dies for fertilizer. Maize and sorghum seed have also been subsidized since 
2005 (Isinika, 2009). Tanzania joined several other African countries (Ghana, 
Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia) that have taken similar steps. In 2008 parliament 
passed the Fertilizer Act to provide for more effective regulation of the fertilizer 
industry, including promoting more effective private sector participation while 
ensuring quality and adherence to standards.5 Other countries, including Kenya 
and Zimbabwe, are also reported to exercise varying degrees of market inter-
vention policies (Minot and Benson, 2009), such as marketing boards, develop-
ment programmes and projects (Cooksey, 2003). There is agreement that the 
span of 10 or 15 years is probably too short for the first generation of reforms, 
focusing on prices, to have their full impacts felt through the economy, espe-
cially in Tanzania, where the economy is still at the pre-industrial stage.
4
 This paper derives from the Afrint I microstudy for Tanzania, for cross-sectional data collected 
in August–September 2002.
5
 http:/www.bunge.go.tz/ POLIS/BTS/general/GENERAL_FR.asp?fpkey.  Accessed 20 December 
2009.
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By the Abuja declaration (2006), African policy makers resolved that mem-
ber states should grant targeted subsidies in favour of the fertilizer sector (AU, 
2006). Thus, the number of African countries resorting to restore subsidies is 
likely to increase. Subsidies are being justified, first, on efficiency grounds. It is 
argued that, following the decline of fertilizer use in many African countries 
after structural adjustment, subsidies can help farmers to reach optimum rates, 
such that additional farm income exceeds the cost of subsidy programmes. 
Second, on equity grounds, it is argued that subsidies may be the most effective 
way of reaching the poor (Minot and Benson, 2009). In Tanzania, the process 
of policy reversal seems to be continuing. In October 2009, the government 
passed a bill to establish a board, which will handle mixed crops – mainly food 
crops. This board is expected to play a role similar to the defunct General 
Agricultural Products Export Corporation (GAPEX), which collapsed during the 
1980s, along with other agricultural parastatal organizations.
There are differing points of view on whether such policy reversal is the 
right or wrong move. Cooksey (2003) argues that patronage, cronyism and 
rent seeking, as well as the desire of governments to go back to the project 
mode, motivated the reversal. Meanwhile, others (Kherallah et al., 2000) argue 
that what is needed is not state withdrawal from the market but an accountable 
and determined developmental state that walks a balanced line to pursue a 
portfolio of instruments which stimulate long-term dynamic growth while mini-
mizing negative distributional impacts. For example, governments can use 
input and output price ratio as a policy instrument – not to be determined 
exclusively by the market. Other policy options could be construction of roads 
and irrigation infrastructure, storage facilities, providing cheap credit, support-
ing cooperatives and establishing other supporting institutions. In the next 
 section, we look at how the production and productivity of food in Tanzania 
has performed, following policy reversal, which restored some direct interven-
tion of the government in the market.
The Impact of Policy and Institutional Change
The period of policy reversal (post-2002) also covers a period when the gov-
ernment of Tanzania is expected to conform to and meet targets set by other 
regional and global frameworks to which Tanzania is a signatory. Under the 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program, which is coordi-
nated by the New Partnership for African Development, the target is to achieve 
6% annual growth rate for agriculture. To achieve this, countries are expected 
to have reached at least 10% annual budgetary allocation by 2010. Agriculture 
is defined to include crops, livestock, forestry and fishing.6 The government 
strives to align national policies and strategies to the MDGs. In relation to food 
security it is MDG1 that is most relevant, whose aim is to reduce by half, 
between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people living under extreme 
 poverty (less than 1US$/day). This goal forms an important component of the 
6
 www.africa.union.org
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National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction, where the target is to 
reduce the proportion of people living below basic needs from 38.6% in 1990 
to 10.3% by 2015, and to reduce the proportion of people living below basic 
food needs from 21.6% in 1990 to 10.8% in 2015. Levels of achievement by 
the year 2000 were 35.7% and 18.7% respectively (Volker, 2005). Looking at 
how Tanzania has fared in terms of resource allocation from the public sector 
in support of agriculture, it is obvious that there is a need to leverage more 
resources from the private sector so that agricultural transformation and  poverty 
reduction can happen at the intended pace, as envisaged.
Has Tanzania attracted more investment into agriculture from local and 
external sources? A study by ESRF (2008) notes that the current public finan-
cial support to agriculture is low compared to regionally and globally. In 
2006/07 spending on agriculture as a share of total public spending was 2.4%, 
compared to 10% in transforming countries during the 1980s, when they 
experienced their agricultural growth spurt (World Bank, 2008 cited by ERSF, 
2008). Isinika (2009) similarly reported low levels of spending, especially in 
real terms. Spending on agriculture as a share of agricultural GDP is equally 
low; being 1.6% in 2006, compared to 4% in other developing agriculture-
based African countries, including Kenya and Uganda (4.1%), Malawi (7.4%), 
Zambia (8.3%) and Zimbabwe (9.3%).
In Tanzania, the ASDS is facing a financing gap, being funded at less than 
50% of the original plan since its commencement in 2005. Future financing 
for ASDP looks equally grim, facing a gap of up to 52.5% of the government 
commitment over the life of the programme up to 2015 (ESRF, 2008; Isinika, 
2009). Funding from development partners, who are expected to cover 21.7% 
of the ASDP cost, has been equally lagging and is actually under threat, as 
some donors opt to switch from the initial sector-wide funding framework back 
to the programme/project mode. In principle, public funding is expected to 
leverage private sector investment from local and external sources, such that in 
the medium and long run the private sector drives agricultural transformation, 
but this is not happening at a desirable rate.
Table 12.2. Public spending in agriculture-based countries. (Adapted from: World Bank, 2008.)
Category of spending
Agriculture-based 
countries
Transforming 
countries
Urbanized 
countries Tanzania
1980 2004 1980 2004 1980 2004 2004 2006
Public spending on 
agriculture 
as a share of total 
spending (%)
6.9 4 14.3 7 8.1 2.7 2.3 1.9
Public spending on 
agriculture as a share 
of total GDP (%)
3.7 4 10.2 10.6 16.9 21.1 1.4 1.3
Share of GDP in  
agriculture (%)
28.8 28.9 24.4 15.6 14.4 10.2 26.1 25.9
[AU 1]
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In order to attract more private sector investment therefore, in 1997, the 
government established the Tanzania Investment Centre under the Investment 
Act, to unify and streamline investment incentives (Pigato, 2000). Although 
Tanzania is listed among African countries which have attracted a fair share of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), such investments have generally gone to extrac-
tive industries and tourism, which have limited backward linkages compared to 
agriculture (Volker, 2005; Msuya, 2007). In agriculture, most investments have 
gone into traditional cash crops rather than food crops. Although the govern-
ment has set up incentive packages including tax holidays,7 economic process-
ing zones and privatization,8 investments into agriculture have been hampered 
by weak physical infrastructure (transportation, communication and energy), 
low quality of labour, accentuated by deteriorating education and health, and 
lack of back-up services for enterprises. Other factors, also found in other 
African countries, are corruption, lack of access to global markets, lack of 
access to finance, high cost of doing business, excessive taxation and weak 
tax regulatory framework and policy uncertainty (Asiedu, 2003; Garbe-
Madhin, 2006).
In the case of Tanzania, it has been argued that the current combined levels 
of public and private investments are too low compared to Asian countries 
 during the 1970s, at the height of their Green Revolution, where expenditure 
on agriculture was up to 20% of government spending, on average, in some 
countries (ESRF, 2008). Some African countries have exceeded their 10% 
commitment to meet the Maputo Declaration but Tanzania is lagging behind. 
By 2008 Tanzania had reached only 6.2%, rising to 7.1% in 2008/09 and 
promising to reach the 10% target in the next budget (2010/11). Despite the 
shortfall, the current level of government commitment to support agriculture 
represents an improvement compared to the past. The challenge remains – 
can these trends be sustained?
An assessment of the first generation of reforms has been summarized by 
Kherallah et al. (2000) as having reduced the fiscal burden, increased competi-
tion and improved timing and delivery of inputs in accessible areas. But the 
reforms did not overcome the underlying problems of credit. The authors go 
on to suggest that there is a need to address other reasons for the low level of 
fertilizer use in Africa, including the low volume of imports resulting in high 
cost, insurance and freight cost of fertilizer, high distribution costs due to poor 
infrastructure and low population density, low levels of irrigation at less than 
5% of the planted area, and lack of credit. In the next section, we assess how 
these challenges have been addressed in Tanzania, during the post-SAP period 
and how the interactive effect of markets, institutional and governance reforms 
7
 In many cases the tax holidays have been assessed to be generous and costly for African 
countries (Pigato, 2000).
8
 The privatization parastatals began in 1992 as part of economic reforms. By 2007, when the 
process was completed, 270 companies had been disposed through divesture or disposal of 
non-core assets. Out of 28 agricultural companies, 21 were privatized to Tanzania nationals, 
while 7 went to foreigners (Isinika, 2009).
Djurfeldt_12.indd   290 9/21/2010   12:03:09 PM
Addressing Tanzanian Food Self-sufficiency 291
have played out in terms of input and service delivery and their ultimate impact 
on productivity, production and food security at the household level and 
 self-sufficiency at the aggregate national level.
Access to and Use of Resources
Land use and land tenure
Land is a key input into any agricultural production process in Tanzania. While 
land that is available to smallholder farmers has not changed since the early 
1990s, utilization has increased significantly, imposing pressure on land. This is 
consistent with findings from the Afrint panel study (Ashimogo et al., 2003; 
Msuya, 2009), where data from Iringa and Morogoro regions show that the 
average area under maize decreased by 13%, from 1.033 ha/household in 
2002 to 0.874 ha/household in 2008 (Fig. 12.1). On the other hand, area 
under rice decreased by 5%, from 1.02 ha/household in 2002 to 0.92 ha/
household in 2008. The same applies to cassava, where the area was 0.267 
ha/household, on average, in 2002, falling to 0.22 ha/household in 2008, 
representing a 17% decline. Considering the population growth and competing 
use of land, the trend towards land scarcity should be expected to increase. 
Whether this trend will encourage more agricultural intensification remains 
uncertain due to partial implementation of the Land Act no. 5 of 1999.
The Land Act no.5, which governs the administration and management of 
village land, requires all villages to be mapped and titled before villages can issue 
customary titles within their boundaries. Since 2003, when the land laws became 
operational, only a few villages have been demarcated and mapped in most 
regions, and even less have title deeds (Kaduma, 2005; Ashimogo, 2008). This 
has encouraged encroachment into village land by serious and speculative inves-
tors. There are some investors who have been invited by local governments to 
Fig. 12.2. Average area under crops (ha/household). (Adapted from: Msuya, 2009.)
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invest in the production and processing of biofuels, as happened recently in Rukwa 
region (Kiwele, 2009). Other investors have been invited to participate in food 
production. For instance, Saudi Arabia has requested to acquire 500,000 hectares 
of land to produce food for exporting to their country. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), among others, has warned developing 
countries of the dangers of such land-grabbing (Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). 
It is evident that, as competition for land intensifies, the land tenure system is not 
robust enough to ensure availability of land for food self-sufficiency.
Tools and implements
The absence of key productive assets such as draught animals and imple-
ments has been identified as another major constraint for agricultural produc-
tivity (Winters et al., 2004). In Tanzania, the hand hoe is the most dominant 
agricultural tool, used by the majority of smallholders for cultivation and 
weeding, accounting for 56% of the planted area, followed by oxen (32%). 
Tractors account for only about 4%, while 8% of the planted area falls under 
no till. Animal-drawn technology (ADT) use is most common in Shinyanga 
region, where about 65.4% of the planted area was cultivated using ADT. 
Use of oxen or donkeys is low in Morogoro (9%) and moderate in Iringa 
(35.6%), but hand cultivation is common in both regions, being used by over 
60% of the households. Data for Afrint II, which was collected in 2008, 
shows little improvement (Msuya, 2009). About 75% of the maize farmers 
used the hand hoe during the most recent harvest, while 22% used ox ploughs 
and only 3% used tractors. More respondents (96%) used the hand hoe in 
Morogoro, compared to 59% in Iringa. In the case of rice production, 81% 
of the farmers used hand hoes, while 19% used tractors, while all farmers 
who planted cassava used hand hoes. There was high and significant positive 
correlation between households that practised lowland irrigated rice and use 
of tractors for land preparation (Msuya, 2009).
The hand hoe and use of other tedious and taxing farm processes have 
been blamed for luring rural youths away from farming. Consequently, the 
farming population is fairly old. The average age of respondents from Afrint II 
was 45 years (Msuya, 2009), having only 5 years of schooling. While the years 
of schooling have not changed compared to a similar study 5 years earlier 
(Ashimogo et al., 2003), the average age has increased by 3 years, which is 
consistent with the observation that younger people often do not choose to 
engage in farming.
The government has expressed the desire to replace the hand hoe with 
more modern technology, especially for land preparation. Tools for weeding, 
especially in rice production, are also being promoted. Under the ASDP, dis-
trict councils have been encouraged to increase the number of power tillers 
available to farmers, who can buy them in groups or as individuals. Groups can 
pay 20% of the value to receive an 80% grant from the District Agricultural 
Investment Fund. The challenge is how to manage a group facility that requires 
regular maintenance and care. Past experiences under the Ujamaa regime 
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 provide many examples of failed efforts of group ownership and management 
of facilities. The policy of giving priority to groups to acquire jointly owned 
tools may require re-evaluation before implementation goes too far.
Transport and communication infrastructure
As noted earlier, private investments in agriculture or any other sector are 
attracted by low cost, which is a function of good transport and communication 
infrastructure. Data from TANROADS9 show that the length of trunk and 
regional roads that are considered to be in good condition has improved from 
4081 km in 2002 to 14,764 km in 2005, representing 14% and 51% of all 
trunk and regional roads for the two periods respectively. Conversely, roads 
considered to be in a poor condition are reported to have decreased from 
14,052 km (49%) in 2002 to 6440 km (22%) in 2006. None the less, lack of 
suitable infrastructure remains a major limiting factor to development in 
Tanzania. It has been reported that Tanzania dropped four notches as a 
favoured destination for foreign direct investment largely due to poor infra-
structure and low education of the labour force (Daily News Tanzania, 2009). 
Funds allocated for road maintenance reached a peak in 2002/03 but have 
declined since then, in both nominal and real terms. Funds for railways and 
harbours also declined between 2002 and 2006 (Isinika, 2009). Although mar-
ket access, which is strongly influenced by the condition of rural roads, remains 
a limiting factor, more respondents of the Afrint II micro-study indicate that 
market access has improved in 2008 compared to 2002 (Msuya, 2009). The 
proportion of respondents reporting carrying luggage on head loads decreased 
from 51% to 41%, while those using bicycles increased from 40% in 2002 to 
57% in 2008. An insignificant proportion of respondents used donkeys or 
motorized transportation (Isinika et al., 2005; Msuya, 2009). These data are 
consistent with most of the farmers selling their crops at the farm gate or 
within-village markets.
Communication by mobile phones is also emerging as an important means 
of transmitting information into rural areas, especially on marketing. The 
mobile phone sector has shown significant growth, while the fixed line sector, 
a monopoly of the state-owned Tanzania Telecommunications Company 
Limited Company, has remained stagnant since 2000. Mobile  telephone pen-
etration currently stands at 30%, growing by 10% in the interval 2006–2009, 
and destined to grow even faster. Estimates show that a 10% increase in pen-
etration will lead to a 1.2% rise in per capita GDP. Platforms such as Nuru 
SMS are emerging. This will provide an opportunity for information-sharing 
for various purposes, including marketing, health and technology, similar to 
Sokoni SMS of Kenya. Other specific uses for agriculture include making more 
9
 TANROADS is a government agency that has the mandate to undertake regular maintenance 
of all regional and trunk roads. TANROADS is represented in every region. Local government 
authorities are responsible for maintaining the district and village roads.
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efficient crop forecasts and more accurate surveys of commodity and input 
demand. This new development is expected to open up uncharted opportuni-
ties for farmers and traders in agriculture. In Tanzania only 34% of the mobile 
phone lines are currently used for business, compared to 85% in Egypt and 
89% in South Africa.10
Irrigation infrastructure
Water is the most limiting factor for food crop production in Tanzania, since 
agriculture is largely rain fed. Only 2.7% of the total planted land was irrigated 
during 2002/03, translating to 211,872 ha on the mainland, of which 77% 
was irrigated during the long rains and the remainder during the short rains. 
The number of smallholders practising irrigation was about 240,721, having 
changed little compared to 1995/6. However, Morogoro and Kigoma regions 
had experienced significant increase in the number of irrigating farmers, while 
Dodoma and Manyara experienced the most decline. Comparing with data 
from the Afrint micro-studies (Ashimogo et al., 2003; Msuya, 2009), it seems 
that the area under irrigation has decreased since 2002. About 48% and 7% 
of the respondents from Iringa and Morogoro respectively reported to have 
irrigated at least 25% of their maize farm during 2002, compared to only 10% 
of the maize farmers in 2008. In the case of rice, however, the farmers who 
practised irrigated lowland rice production increased from 1% in 2002 to 16% 
in 2008. However, only 1% among them grew more than one crop per year 
(Msuya, 2009). Considering the current threat posed by climate change, as a 
result of which some regions of Tanzania are expected to have subnormal rains 
while others expect to get above-normal rains (Agrawala et al., 2003), devel-
oping irrigation is strategically important. After 2 years of implementation, the 
ASDP review reported that the area under irrigation had increased by 25,000 ha 
(0.9%), from 264,000 to 289,000 ha from 2006 to 2008 (Mlaki, 2008), 
 representing a 36% increase (from 211,872 ha in 2002). None the less, this 
new level represents less than 4% of the total planted land.
Services
Besides inputs, tools and implements, farmers also need quality services (exten-
sion, research, information, business development, marketing and others) in 
order to optimize technology use as well as market opportunities. Farmers also 
need to be involved in planning for their development at various levels so that 
their input contributes to making the services relevant for them. However, there 
has been failure in general to integrate research and extension as complementary 
services, especially at the district level. Districts have been slow to widen the 
10
 http:www.telecomsmarketresearch.com/reseach/ TMAAAQUQ-Tanzania (accessed 2 December 
2009).
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scope of service providers by inviting other non-state service providers (private 
sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organiza-
tions) to participate in service provision through competitive biding, as required 
under the ASDP (Ashimogo, 2008; Development Associates, 2008; Matee 
et al., 2008; Mlaki, 2008). It requires a mindset transformation among local 
government staff so that they perceive non-state service providers as comple-
menting the limited capacity of the government services rather than public exten-
sion staff. The current number of village extension agents represents only 22.4% 
of the requirement (Isinika, 2009). The government has set up a crash pro-
gramme to train 3000 additional agricultural technical staff (at certificate and 
diploma level) within 3 years (2009–2011), who will be hired by local govern-
ment authorities. This would increase the number of beneficiaries who access 
agricultural extension services from the current 35% to 45% (Ashimogo, 2008). 
Meanwhile, studies have consistently shown that traders, input suppliers and neigh-
bours are the most common source of production and marketing information 
among farmers (Isinika and Mdoe, 2001; Ashimogo, 2008).
Availability of financial services has been another limiting factor. Since 
1994, the government established a revolving agricultural input trust fund to fill 
the vacuum following the collapse of cooperatives during the 1970s and failed 
attempts to revive them during the 1980s. However, the fund has not lived up 
to its expectation.
Available data shows that between 2002 and 2006 only 1130 loans were 
issued, being less than 200 loans per year, and the beneficiaries have often 
been well-connected government and political leaders as well as business own-
ers (Isinika, 2009). Other avenues for smallholder farmers to access credit have 
included Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOS), various microfi-
nance institutions, the presidential empowerment fund, local government sup-
port project fund and banks. However, lending from commercial banks has not 
specifically targeted agriculture (Fig. 12.2). Moreover, interest rates remain too 
high at (15–22%) for most agricultural investments to benefit.
The tax regime and inflation have also had their toll on agriculture. At one 
time the sector faced 55 taxes, compared to 7 in Zambia, 4 in South Africa and 
25 in Morocco (Ashimogo, 2008). The government has removed a number of 
taxes that undermined agriculture. In addition, there are some agricultural 
activities which have been zero-rated for Value Added Tax (VAT).11 These 
include all unprocessed agricultural produce (but not for local market), indus-
tries producing agricultural inputs (fertilizer, fishing gear, pesticides) and VAT 
rebate for small agricultural exporters (through cooperative unions or associa-
tions). Most smallholder farmers, however, cannot benefit from VAT rebate 
since they are not registered (URT, 2007). Further reforms are necessary to 
liberate the sector, because the tax burden remains relatively high. It has been 
reported that, despite the tax reforms, agriculture pays 17 times more tax than 
industry (5% compared to 0.3%). A 10% reduction in taxes to agriculture would 
raise annual economic growth rate by 0.43% (URT, 2007). Inflation is another 
11
 In accordance with the VAT Act of 1997.
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vice that must be addressed. Until 2003, inflation had been successfully reduced 
to below 5%, from an all-time high above 30% during the 1980s and early 
1990s. From 2005, inflation began creeping up, reaching 14.8% in June 
2008, influenced by rising food and fuel prices globally but also due to increas-
ing borrowing by the government. Although inflation since declined to around 
10.3% in 2009, it rose again to 12.2% by December of the same year. 
Moreover, this level is too high for healthy economic development. In addition, 
rising food staple prices have the potential to choke off growth from demand-side 
linkages (Delgado et al., 1999).
Fertilizer use and other inputs
In Tanzania, the percentage of households using inorganic fertilizer remains 
very low but is improving in the case of maize. Currently only 9 kg are used per 
hectare, compared to 27 kg in Malawi, 53 kg in South Africa, 16 kg for SADC 
and 279 kg in China (URT and TBC, 2009). Although the supply of fertilizer 
has increased since 2004, following government’s deliberate efforts to enhance 
fertilizer use by restoring the subsidy, supply still lies in the range of 50–80% of 
what is required (Fig. 12.3).
Results from the Afrint II micro-study (Msuya, 2009) show that about 21% 
of the sampled farmers used artificial fertilizer for maize production during the 
most recent season, representing an improvement from 2002, especially in 
Iringa region, where significantly more respondents (16%) indicated the amount 
of fertilizer used has increased, probably reflecting the effect of the fertilizer sub-
sidy programme introduced by the government since 2002/03. The fertilizer 
subsidy has increased tenfold in the last 5 years (since 2005). In the case of rice, 
not much has changed since 2002, as 88% reported not using any artificial 
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 fertilizer during both periods. No artificial fertilizer was used for cassava production, 
but manure use increased from 19% in 2002 to 25% in 2008 (Msuya, 2009).
The use agrochemicals is much lower, being applied to only about 9% of 
the planted area in mainland Tanzania, and even lower for fungicides (2%) and 
herbicides (2%). However, insecticides are used more often (72% of the applied 
area) than fungicides (15%) and herbicides (13%) in mainland Tanzania. Iringa 
and Shinyanga regions had the highest planted area to which agrochemicals 
were applied, probably due to production of permanent cash crops (cotton and 
tobacco) (URT, 2006). From the Afrint II micro-study (Msuya, 2009), overall, 
43% of the respondents used pesticides on maize during the most recent  season 
(Table 12.3), being significantly higher in Iringa (73%) compared to Morogoro 
(3%), which has not changed since 2002, when corresponding  figures were 
72% and 3% respectively. Meanwhile, there seems to be marked increase in 
pesticide use for rice production. About 71% of the households who cultivated 
paddy rice applied pesticides in 2008 compared to less than 33% in 2002. 
Also one farmer used pesticides for cassava compared to none in 2002. This 
could indicate rising awareness and availability of this input or a rising trend of 
pests forcing farmers to look for solutions.
Use of improved seed represents only 7% of the demand (URT and TBC, 
2009). Results from Afrint II (Msuya, 2009) reflect the continued dominance 
of traditional seed, which was used by 73% of the maize farmers, 95% of the 
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Table 12.3. Use of selected improved inputs.
Fertilizer on maize
Improved 
maize seed
Pesticides 
on maize
Pesticides 
on rice
2002 16 12 <10 33
2008 21 27 43 71
% Change 7 15 >33 38
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rice farmers and 20% of the farmers planting cassava. Conversely, only 27% 
of the respondents planted improved maize seed, being higher in Iringa (37%) 
than in Morogoro (13%). This represents an increase compared to 2002, when 
only 12% and 3% of the maize farmers in Iringa and Morogoro, respectively, 
used improved seed. The trend towards using more improved maize seed has 
been increasing since 2001/02 (Fig. 12.4), and it should be expected to accel-
erate further, since distribution of improved seed now also benefits from the 
transport subsidy, which was extended to cover seed as well since 2006/07.
The use of improved rice seed has also been increasing since 2004/05, but 
according to Msuya (2009) only one farmer out of 194 in Morogoro region12 
planted NERICA or NERICA descendants. During 2008, the majority of farmers 
(64%) acquired maize seed from their own stock; 12% obtained seed from neigh-
bours; 21% bought from the market; and 3.2% got maize seed from NGOs. 
Likewise the main source of rice seed was own stock (76%), followed by other farm-
ers (13%), marketplace (7%) and purchased from extension agents and NGOs (4%).
Production and Food Security Response at Macro Level
Crop production
Considering the policy and institutional environment, let’s now look at how 
farmers have responded in terms of production of the main food crops. Maize 
is the main staple crop, followed by rice and cassava. Sorghum and millet are 
important in drier parts of the country. Maize is grown in all regions of mainland 
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12
 Only one and two farmers reported growing rice in Iringa during 2008 and 2002 respectively.
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Tanzania but regions in the south (Iringa, Mbeya, Rukwa and Ruvuma – the big 
four) dominate, producing about 40% of the maize in 2005. Production of 
maize has been increasing very gradually since 2002/03, the combined effect 
of area expansion and yield increase (Fig. 12.5). The trend in Iringa mirrors the 
national aggregate, reflecting the impact of fertilizer subsidy and the impact of 
the big four regions on the national supply of maize. Effective from 2008, 
Morogoro and Kigoma regions have been added to regions that are focal for 
food production. It would be expected that the level of food production will 
improve to match the ambition of Kilimo Kwanza, such that Tanzania becomes 
a net exporter of maize to neighbouring countries (URT and TBC, 2009).
Rice, which is mainly produced in five regions (Morogoro, 19.7%; 
Shinyanga, 18.5%; Mwanza, 13.6%; Tabora, 10.2%; and Mbeya, 8.5% in 
2002/03), has also shown increasing production, largely from area expansion. 
The yield of rice has not increased consistently for two consecutive years, 
reflecting annual variation of rainfall and the low level of improved technologies 
(seed, spacing, fertilizer), as discussed earlier. The average yield of rice in 
2005/06 was 1.3 ts/ha, 34% lower than that obtained in 2001/02 (1.96 t/ha). 
The production trend for Morogoro region mirrors the national aggregate 
 (Fig. 12.6), reflecting this region’s influence, which produces about one-fifth of 
the rice national supply.
Cassava has similarly exhibited rising production since 2004 (Fig. 12.7), 
largely attributed to productivity gain. The area under cassava has changed very 
gradually, growing at 6% annually. Meanwhile, cassava yield has increased from 
1.5 t/ha in 2002/03 to 2.1 t/ha in 2005/06, probably reflecting recovery from 
the devastating attack of cassava mosaic during the 1990s, the yield recovery 
being due to introduced varieties that are resistant to mosaic virus. The produc-
tion and yield of sorghum has remained almost stable nationally since 2002/03, 
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but there has been a significant yield increase in Morogoro region (Msuya, 2009), 
where the lead research station for sorghum and millet is located. It is safe to 
assume that uptake of improved sorghum seed would be higher here.
Food self-sufficiency
Despite the observed gradual production increase, and in some cases a decline, 
production of the main food staple crops has, in general, kept pace or is slightly 
ahead of the population growth rate: 2.8% compared to growth of main staple 
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crops (6.4% for maize and 7.3% for rice). Overall, Tanzania is self-sufficient for 
maize during most years, which is the most important food crop, contributing 
about 31% of the food supply, according to crop estimates for 2005/06. 
Cassava comes second (19%), followed by potatoes (13%), and sorghum and 
rice rank fourth (7%) (URT, 2006).
Analysis of data for the period (1994/95–2007/08) shows that food 
 self-sufficiency in Tanzania was achieved in 9 out of 14 years when the self-
sufficiency ratio (SSR) was between 102% and 118%, with a gradual declining 
trend since 1996/97 until 2003/04, then gaining gradual momentum since 
then (Fig. 12.8). Pockets of food shortage continue to exist in about 8 regions 
(38%) and 37 districts (33%). During the 8-year period 2001/02–2007/08, 
the number of regions which experienced food deficit ranged between 5 and 
14, while the number of districts was between 13 and 62, being lowest in 
2002/03 and highest in 2003/04, which was a dry year. The north-eastern 
part of the country had also been hit hard by a severe drought during this year 
(2009), but the southern part of the country had a good crop, ameliorating the 
effect of the drought (Appendix 12.3).
Is this performance good enough to meet household food security needs 
and national self-sufficiency? Will this trend in production and productivity ena-
ble Tanzania live up to the ambition of being a net food exporter, as proclaimed 
under Kilimo Kwanza. While there are indications of a gradual improvement in 
the macro-production of all main food crops (maize, rice and cassava), the rate 
of production and productivity growth is not enough to meet set development 
targets. Let us now examine the response of smallholders farmers to the above-
mentioned policy and institutional changes, drawing evidence from the Afrint I 
(Ashimogo et al., 2003) and Afrint II studies (Msuya, 2009), specifically focus-
ing on three major agriculture transformation constraints: (i) the subsistence 
nature of markets (measured in terms of percentage of marketed produce, 
whereby a high degree of subsistence exists if more than 50% of produce is for 
own consumption); (ii) transaction costs (defined as the total cost of transform-
ing products through space, form and time, along with the costs of arranging 
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transactions in complete agricultural systems); and (iii) missing market (measured 
by limitations farmers face in accessing market institutions).
Subsistence nature of maize, rice and cassava markets
Participation of farmers in markets is necessary for structural transformation 
from subsistence agriculture to an economy based on specialization, exchange 
and technological innovation. For the Afrint II micro-study (Msuya, 2009), 
overall, 53% of total harvested maize was used for home consumption, while 
38% was sold. Cassava, however, was produced mostly for subsistence. 
Although the proportion of households participating in cassava markets 
decreased from 21% in 2002 to only 8% in 2008, market participation had 
changed very little, involving 46% and 47% of the respondents over the two 
periods respectively, 85% selling at the farm gate and 10% at the village 
market. On the other hand, rice was mostly produced for the market. Fifty-
five per cent of the harvested paddy was sold. The remainder was used for 
home consumption (35%), paying hired labour (5%) and others uses (5%). 
The percentage of paddy sold has also increased, from 49% in 2002 to 55% 
during the most recent season.
In the case of maize, 52% of the farmers sold maize following the most 
recent harvest, representing an increase relative to 2002 (Ashimogo et al., 
2003), but with regional differences. Actually, the proportion of households 
from Morogoro region selling maize has dropped from 49% in 2002 to 39% 
in 2008, but it has increased for Iringa, from 42% to 56% over the same inter-
val. Meanwhile, the proportion of households participating in paddy trade has 
remained above 70% in the past three recent seasons. Compared to maize, 
paddy production was more commercially oriented. Of those who sold maize, 
less than 10% were net sellers. There was a positive and significant (P > 0.001) 
correlation between average per cent of staple food crops sold by households 
and total household income. Overall 60% of households indicated sale of food 
staples generated most cash in the course of last year, followed by sale of other 
food crops (13%) and micro-business (11%). Sale of food for cash income was 
more pronounced in Morogoro region, where 81% of respondents in Morogoro 
said sale of food staples was the major source of income, compared to 39% of 
household in Iringa, implying more options for diversification in Iringa, proba-
bly due to better accessibility for most of the villages within the sample. These 
findings differ from the conclusion by Kherallah et al. (2000), that reforms 
have been more beneficial to export crops.
As was the case for maize, paddy was mostly sold at the farm gate, as 
indicated by 77% of households that sold paddy. Fifty per cent sold paddy at 
the village market, while only 8% sold in markets outside the village. After har-
vesting, farmers collect and store the maize at home and sell it only when they 
need cash. Depending on the urgency of household cash needs, farmers would 
sell at any price just to cover the immediate cash needs. There are many factors 
constraining the participation of farmers in markets but the most important is 
poorly functioning markets, which squeeze them out (domestic and regional). 
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In theory, subsistence agriculture is seen as just an early stage of development, 
which will perish once Ricardo’s comparative advantages are perceived and 
result in wealth-generating trade (Abele and Frohberg, 2003). This does not 
seem to be happening in Tanzania due to poorly functioning markets.
Transaction cost (institutions, infrastructure and information)
High transaction costs are another major problem facing farmers, often due to 
high transport costs along with limited market information, lack of product 
standards and low competitiveness of markets. According to Msuya et al. 
(2009), maize farmers receive about 53% of the final price when a sack of 
maize (100–120 kg) is sold within the same region and about 45% when it is 
sold across regions. What is wrong with this is that, first, high transport and 
handling costs are passed on to consumers, who pay high food prices. Secondly, 
there is no value added whatsoever along the chain. Limited market informa-
tion and lack of product standards compound the transaction cost problem.
Limited flow of information also makes market coordination difficult and 
inefficient. For example, most farmers do not know the selling price before 
making production decisions. Information asymmetry between sellers and buy-
ers creates room for dishonest traders to take advantage of farmers’ lack of 
price information. If emerging SMS platforms for information sharing, as noted 
earlier, are encouraged and supported, this problem should decline as mobile 
phone technology reaches deeper into rural areas. The main source of price 
information for both traders and maize farmers includes friends and neighbours 
(Msuya et al., 2009), similar to findings of another study 10 years earlier (Isinika 
and Mdoe, 2001). Cross-checking with many middlemen is another popular 
source of information for farmers, even though it is well known that middlemen 
often collude to offer lower prices to farmers. The public market information 
system is the least used means of price information because it is often unrelia-
ble and inaccessible (Msuaya, 2009).
Sometimes, farmers opt to take their produce to markets directly to avoid 
being cheated by middlemen. Given the high cost of transport due to poor infra-
structure, small amounts of produce to be sold and unreliable product markets, 
the whole exercise is largely inefficient. Meanwhile, the number of middlemen 
is still increasing, thus adding the squeeze on what the smallholders receive, and 
when they collude to offer low prices, they effectively operate as a private 
monopoly/monopsony, thereby nullifying the whole purpose of liberalization 
(Winters et al., 2004). Farmers are also squeezed on account of quality, when 
traders do not pay a premium for quality improvement and farmers, in turn, do 
not invest to present the best-quality products in the market. In the case of the 
Afrint II study (Msuya, 2009), maize quality had minimal impact on the price 
offered by traders. About 60% of farmers indicated that traders did not pay a 
lower price for their produce as a result of postharvest quality deterioration. 
Only 6% of sampled farmers who sold maize indicated they received a lower 
price for most of their produce due to postharvest quality deterioration. Quality 
control by rewarding higher prices for better quality is an important incentive for 
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quality improvement. There was minimal quality differentiation in the case of 
cassava, as 25% of farmers indicated that traders paid a lower price for some 
produce due to postharvest quality deterioration. Paddy markets, however, were 
more differentiated by quality. Up to 43% of farmers received much lower prices 
from traders as a result of postharvest quality deterioration.
Lack of standards, which is quite prevalent in the maize marketing system 
in Tanzania, distorts the market in two ways. First, as one price is paid for dif-
ferent grades of maize, it removes the incentive for farmers to produce high-
quality maize. Smallholders are undermined again, since most of the 
procurement at lower levels (village) uses volume measures (tins and buckets) 
instead of weight (kg). These findings differ from the assertion by Rweyemamu 
(2003), who argued that markets can assure product quality, hence there is no 
need for commodity boards to issue export permits or register growers, which 
creates market barriers. This would have nullified the proposed move by the 
government to establish another commodity board for mixed crops. It should 
be noted, however, that there are many other countries that maintain regula-
tory boards for different purposes. For example, the Farm Products Council of 
Canada has the mission to oversee the national supply and management of 
poultry and eggs and national promotion of research agencies to ensure an 
efficient system works in the balanced interest of stakeholders, from producers 
to consumers. Similar agricultural and marketing boards are also found in many 
other countries. Often, these boards are formed by stakeholders, to whom they 
are accountable, even though they may receive subsidies from the 
government.
Missing markets
Missing and thin markets are common in many African countries due to prob-
lems of public good failure, access failure and transaction failure (Doward, 
2005). In addition to problems of poor infrastructure alluded to earlier, missing 
or thin markets for credit, labour and information on potentially tradable com-
modities have been cited as constraints to market integration in Africa (Asharf 
et al., 2008). High contract risks, lack of credit facilities, high price and una-
vailability of inputs in the staple food crops subsector are signs that input and 
credit markets are missing in the current market set-up. Price uncertainties 
remain very high in the maize market. Without contractual agreements farmers 
are not assured of next season’s price and thus tend to produce just enough for 
subsistence.
For the Afrint II study (Msuya, 2009), only 3% of sampled farmers grew 
maize on the basis of a prearranged contract with private traders. None of the 
households that sold cassava had a prearranged contract with private traders, 
while less than 2% of the paddy farmers had contractual agreements with 
 private traders. This is despite efforts by the government to promote and 
encourage this form of market arrangement as a solution to linking smallholder 
farmers to markets, while also working to improve farmers’ collective voice 
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through cooperatives and improving the policy environment, as discussed 
 earlier. While the contact-farming model involving smallholders has worked 
somehow for traditional cash crops (sugar, tea, sisal) and commodities that 
require central handling and/or processing (horticulture, dairy), it is yet to be 
developed for annual food crops such as maize and rice. The warehouse receipt 
system has been tested for rice and cashew nuts but the tendency of contract-
ing parties to cheat (both farmers and traders) remains high, largely attributed 
to failure to enforce contracts. The warehouse receipt system law, which was 
enacted in 2008, has attempted to tighten such loopholes (Isinika, 2009). It 
remains to be seen if this will improve contract enforcement in farming as a 
model for smallholder farmers.
The number of farmers accessing credit is also low; a sign of missing credit 
markets, limiting in turn the use of inputs. Only 17% of farmers had obtained 
agricultural inputs on credit in the most recent season (Msuya, 2009), being 
higher than the national average of 3% in 2002 (URT, 2006). This is a result 
of eliminating support prices and grain marketing boards (under SAPs), together 
with a weak private sector. Informal lending institutions, which tend to have 
very high interest rates, have now become the major source of credit for both 
traders and farmers of major staple food crops. Even with the reintroduction of 
fertilizer subsidies in the Southern Highlands zone, farmers find it difficult to 
access inputs due to very high prices, pushing farmers further towards subsist-
ence. In 2002, Morogoro region had twice the number of households catego-
rized as very poor, compared to Iringa region (Ashimogo et al., 2003). During 
2008 the number of households categorized as very poor is almost the same 
for Iringa and Morogoro regions (Msuya, 2009), probably reflecting the higher 
dependency on purchased inputs for farmers in Iringa (see Fig. 12.9).
Although the implementation of SAPs increased competition and reduced 
marketing costs in many cases, its overall impact on farmers has, in general, been 
negative (Msuya et al., 2009). According to Ponte (2002) and Gabre-Madhin 
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Fig.12.10. Wealth status of households with respect to assets ownership 2008. (Adapted from: 
Msuya, 2009.)
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(2006), the gap left by the state in secondary distribution and credit provision has 
not been adequately compensated by the private sector, and both these markets, 
together with output markets, are altogether missing in many parts of sub- Saharan 
Africa, including Tanzania. The development of a wide range of private marketing 
institutions is important for smallholders to improve market access, which will 
then induce a stronger production response of food and other crops.
The Way Forward: Need for Balanced Reforms
For Tanzania to be a net exporter of food, her aggregate self-sufficiency ratio 
has to exceed 120% consistently over time, which has not been achieved since 
1995. Moreover, per capita production of food has been declining. According 
to data from the FAO (FAOSTAT), by 1999 per capita food production in 
Tanzania stood at 108 tonnes, compared to 135 tonnes for Africa and 343 
tonnes for the world as a whole. The percentage of irrigated land stood at 
3.3%, compared to 3.8% for Africa and 18.3% for the world; intensity of 
 fertilizer use was 5 kg/ha, compared to 12 kg/ha for Africa and 94 kg/ha for 
the world, and average daily per capita calories supply, at 1940, remains below 
the average for Africa and the world. While the growth rate of agriculture has 
improved, from less than 2% in 1997 and 1999 to around 4% since 2002 
(see Fig. 12A.1 in Appendix 2), it remains below the target of 6% set by the 
Maputo Declaration (AU, 2006; Minde et al., 2008). Since agriculture remains 
the largest sector in the economy, accounting for 24.6% of total GDP by 
2007, poor performance of this sector also pulls down overall economic 
 performance. If food production is to play a leading role in poverty reduction, 
therefore, more needs to be done to improve the performance of agriculture, 
especially food crops production, which is the largest subsector within agriculture 
(BOT, 2008).
The first generation of reforms in Tanzania had a strong focus on prices, 
but it has since been demonstrated that getting prices right is not enough; 
market development should remain on the reform agenda. For example, fer-
tilizer prices are only one of several factors affecting use (Kherallah et al., 
2000; Rune, 2005; Minot and Benson, 2009). Well-functioning markets, 
defined by adequate infrastructure, functioning market institutions and better 
incentives, are vital for agricultural transformation to take place. According to 
Pingali (1997), for a smooth transformation of agriculture there should be 
long-term strategies, including investment in rural markets, transportation and 
communications infrastructure, to facilitate integration of the rural economy. 
Likewise, to complete the reforms, governments should, in addition, promote 
good governance and improve the state’s capacity to monitor market develop-
ment in order to encourage market participation and competition, and contract 
enforcement, as well as property governance, to avoid channelling invest-
ments to rent-seeking groups (Pingali, 1997). Other aspects of the reform 
should include encouraging farmers to diversify, with a focus on specialization, 
addressing problems of vulnerable groups in remote areas, where price trans-
mission is often poor, and continuing to institute credible macroeconomic 
Djurfeldt_12.indd   306 9/21/2010   12:03:10 PM
Addressing Tanzanian Food Self-sufficiency 307
 policies. Equally important, governments should constantly monitor whether 
markets exist at all, especially to meet the needs of the poor. According to 
Winters et al. (2004), extreme adverse poverty shocks are often associated with 
the disappearance of markets, while strong poverty alleviation can arise when 
markets are created for previously untraded or unavailable goods or services.
With functioning markets in place, several benefits emerge, including rising 
investment in agriculture and subsequent farm growth, organizing farmers to 
strengthen their position in the markets to benefit from economies of scale, 
and improvements of other institutions such as policies that foster trade and 
reduce transaction costs. All these are expected to have a higher chance of 
producing desired results when markets are efficient. Currently, agricultural 
markets are undergoing rapid changes due to globalization, among other 
things. It is obvious from the preceding discussion that market institutions are 
the key missing link in government’s efforts to transform agriculture. Building 
market institutions is a long-term strategy expected to reduce investment risk 
and decrease transaction costs for both farmers and traders by clarifying prop-
erty rights, enforcing contracts, ensuring quality control and establishing rules 
of market conduct, among other legal concerns. While incentives and infra-
structure components can be spearheaded by the public sector, building of 
market institutions is a role championed by the private sector. However, for 
smallholder farmers to benefit from such developments they need to be better 
organized.
Before liberalization (implementation of SAPs) smallholder farmers were 
mostly organized under cooperatives. The economic functions of these coop-
eratives included distribution of subsidized inputs on credit as well as bulking of 
farm produce. Primary cooperative societies were the main vehicles for assem-
bling produce at the farm gate, while second-tier structures such as the coop-
erative unions were responsible for intermediate processing and marketing, 
usually to the parastatal marketing boards (for either export or domestic distri-
bution). The cooperatives enforced quality standards and assured farmers of a 
market outlet and predictable prices (URT, 2005). However, after liberalization, 
cooperatives were mostly marginalized and completely abandoned in some 
parts due to mistrust by farmers regarding government motives and poor gov-
ernance by managers (URT, 2005). This led to inefficient markets, which in 
turn forced farmers to act independently in production and marketing of pro-
duce, and eventually many cooperatives collapsed, having the most negative 
impact on the production and marketing of food crops. By improving market-
ing efficiency, marginal farmers can again participate in the market. Reducing 
fixed marketing costs or reducing farmer-specific marketing costs, especially 
for smallholders who are currently not participating in the market, will improve 
marketing efficiency.
For the Afrint II study (Msuya, 2009), only 17% of households (20% in 
Iringa and 14% in Morogoro) were members of farmer associations. Although 
the number of SACCOS has increased recently, they have little to do with 
staple food crops’ production and marketing. Rising urbanization and growing 
consumer power exerts a growing influence on food production and market-
ing systems. On one hand, demand for processed convenient foods is rising, 
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creating new market opportunities for high-value products as well as staples. 
None the less, these developments impose new constraints to the conven-
tional markets. Generally, changes in these markets create significant access 
challenges for farmers, including more stringent quality and standards, 
increased variability in prices and bulking difficulties, which limit regularity of 
supply of economic volumes by smallholders as well as resulting in increased 
transaction costs (Sautier and Biénabe, 2005). The future and prosperity of 
farmers thus depends largely on how they are organized to overcome such 
challenges. Given this reality, reorganizing smallholders is crucial for them to 
benefit from market institutions being developed by the private sector. 
Organizing traders who still play an important role in local markets is equally 
important. Social capital remains a significant barrier to entry in wholesale 
and external trade as well as in transportation. Markets are risky, personalized 
and cash based (Kherallah et al., 2000).
According to Msuya (2007), integrated producer schemes designed to 
develop the capacities of smallholders through extensive provision of extension 
services and close monitoring of production and quality control are a better 
form of producer association, especially those focusing on specific value chains, 
compared to conventional and multipurpose cooperatives (which were mostly 
politically motivated). It has been observed that creation and development of 
market institutions is easier for crops whose farmers are well organized. 
Institutional innovations, such as contract farming, credit associations, group 
lending and the warehouse receipt systems, are being developed by different 
actors, including NGOs and development projects (Ashimogo, 2008).
Integrated producer schemes introduce a competitive environment by mak-
ing prices a public good. In other words, contracts between the two parties will 
include price information, and such prices will be available to all farmers in the 
area as a benchmark for decision making. Given such interventions, smallholders 
will have certainty on prices. Secondly, farmers are motivated to improve prod-
uct quality if they are rewarded with higher prices. As prices are certain, farmers 
can now concentrate on lowering transaction costs by achieving economies of 
scale. This becomes sustainable if smallholders are well organized. Establishment 
of wholesale markets (auctions) in major buying areas would probably create the 
same impact by making prices public. Therefore, efforts to foster integration and 
creation of strong bonds between smallholders and  private sector actors within 
value/supply chins through integrated producer schemes can increase market 
participation and productivity and hence improve food security.
Conclusion
This discussion set out to assess the impact of policy and institutional reforms 
for agricultural transformation in Tanzania. Tanzania, like many other African 
countries, was forced to accept donor prescription for economic reforms dur-
ing 1986, in order to address declining economic trends in all sectors of the 
economy. Expectations were raised that the economic downturn would be 
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reversed if recommendations were followed according to the Washington con-
sensus – focusing on macroeconomic stability, market liberalization and getting 
prices right. Many of the prescriptions for African countries have borrowed 
heavily from the Asian experience, despite many contextual and temporal dif-
ferences, such as the effect of globalization.
The first generation of economic reforms were followed by institutional 
reforms during the 1990s, which covered a number of aspects, including land 
reforms, local government reforms, tax reforms and other institutional reforms. 
Specific to agriculture, the government developed a sector strategy (ASDS) and 
programme (ASDP) to guide transformation. While these reforms brought 
 partial success to realign macroeconomic stability during the 1990s, empirical 
evidence points that the gains are not strong enough to bring about significant 
transformation as expected.
The immediate aftermath of the reforms was to increase the participation 
of actors from the private sector. In agriculture these actors sought opportuni-
ties in the provision of inputs (fertilizer, pesticides and farm implements). There 
have also been improvements in credit availability. However, the grace period 
did not last long. As soon as all direct and indirect subsidies were removed in 
1994, the country experienced a declining trend in the production and produc-
tivity of food production. Use of purchased inputs declined, coinciding with 
reduced opportunities for fallowing as pressure on land increased, creating 
room for further soil fertility decline due to soil mining. Investments in agricul-
ture were not increasing at the expected rate, thus limiting the follow on of 
public goods (roads, irrigation, research, extension, etc.) and private goods 
(value addition, communication, transport, etc.). It is now evident that, while 
some success was recorded, the reforms were not enough to unlock prevailing 
problems of thin, weakly integrated and missing markets for credit, inputs and 
outputs. The reforms could also not respond in the time of price volatility ema-
nating from globalization since the 1990s. Critics have blamed such failure on 
half-hearted partial adoption of the reforms. Others point to inadequate time 
for the full impact of the reforms to play out.
Considering the gravity of the declining production threat, something had to 
be done. The government of Tanzania joined several other African countries to 
reverse earlier hands-off policies. First, a partial transport subsidy has been restored 
for fertilizer and improved seed since 2001. Secondly, marketing boards have 
been retained and more are being formed to oversee coordination of key subsec-
tors within agriculture. Proponents of market reforms lament that such reversal is 
motivated by the rent-seeking interests of a few at the expense of economic effi-
ciency. There is a counterargument, however, that hands-off is not an optimum 
solution. What is required is a developmental state that will pursue market media-
tion in a balanced manner so that private sector participation is supported and 
enhanced by providing a conducive policy and institutional environment, and 
 necessary public goods and services. This essentially calls for a balancing act to 
ensure sustainable dynamic growth of agriculture and hence the economy.
Evidence from the post-2000 data shows that, following the policy reversal, 
something positive is happening. There is improvement in agricultural input 
availability; some gains are seen in production and productivity, especially for 
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maize, and food self-sufficiency remains marginally stable. There is a rising 
trend of credit availability and use; some gains are observed for area under 
irrigation and there are government efforts to increase investments into agricul-
ture, including leveraging resources from the private sector. The analysis shows, 
however, that the trend rates of all these changes are still too weak to bring 
about visible sector-wide transformation and sustained dynamic growth.
For these reasons, some recommendations are made in order to sustain the 
positive gains that have been attained thus far. Considering the importance of 
food production for poverty reduction, efforts to support agriculture should also 
focus on supporting food production. Partial reforms have been blamed for the 
weak results observed until now. It has therefore been recommended that continu-
ing efforts on the reforms should foster long-term dynamic growth so that actors 
benefit from improving access to technologies along with improving capital goods, 
economies of scale and competition induced by fully functioning markets.
To overcome the limitations of subsistence production, characterized by 
autarchy, it is recommended that government should pursue complementary 
policies, which target small farmers to accumulate assets that will enable them 
to benefit from opportunities availed by the ongoing economic and institutional 
reforms. Essentially, efforts should be directed at improving market coordina-
tion, including reducing the cost of coordination, enforcement of contracts, 
enhancing collective action and reducing the risk of all actors in the market. As 
concluded by Garbe-Madhin (2006):
the potential for harnessing markets for smallholder agricultural development 
depends on both market development and addressing challenges of scale, location, 
assets and power. Building institutions requires tailoring to a country context and 
product nature, capturing linkages between institutions rather than a piece-meal 
approach.
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Appendix 1
Table 12A.1. National food security statuses. Adapted from: URT, 2006 and unpublished data.
Measure of food 
security status 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 Average
National level 
(SSR%)
94 102 88 103 102 110 106 101
Number of 
food-deficit 
regions
6 4 14 6 10 5 5 7
Number of 
food-deficit 
districts
15 13 62 41 41 50 – 37
Appendix 2
Fig.12A.1. Agricultural and total GDP growth rate. (Adapted from: BOT, 2008.)
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Appendix 3
Fig.12A.2. Tanzania food security outlook: October 2009–March 2010. (Adapted from: 
Famine Early Warning Network System Network FEWSNET, September 2009.)
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